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Abstract 
The supply of, and demand for, the reconstruction of Syria is grossly 
mismatched in both focus and volume. This essay examines whether 
Russia, the United States, the European Union, Iran, Turkey, Saudi 
Arabia and Israel are likely to close, maintain or increase this gap. 
Such an examination helps assess the prospects for Syria’s future sta-
bility. In the final analysis, the combination of the variable global in-
terests of the US (war on terror, anti-Iran) and Russia (re-establishing 
great power status, keeping Syria on its side) with the regional conflict 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran makes the reconstruction of Syria hos-
tage to irreconcilable agendas given the country’s association with 
Iran. Potential intermediaries like Turkey and the EU will not engage 
in countrywide reconstruction at this point. Turkey suffers from do-
mestic turmoil and radical shifts in its foreign policy that have ren-
dered it ineffective, while the EU’s foreign policy indecisiveness has 
relegated it to the sidelines. Israel was never going to engage directly 
in Syria’s reconstruction but also finds itself without political influ-
ence other than the one-trick pony of its regular airstrikes. The result 
is that the reconstruction of Syria will be fragmented, incomplete and 
focused on the immediate interests of the regime, Russia and Iran, with 
attendant negative consequences for the livelihood prospects of the av-
erage Syrian in the short to medium term. There is an urgent need for 
detailed scenario-planning that explores the long-term consequences 
of this state of play – for the Syrian regime, for the Syrian population, 
for Syria’s neighbours and beyond. 
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Introduction 
The war in Syria has easily been the most violent and ruinous 
internationalised civil war of the 21st century so far.1 Its esti-
mated 370,000–570,000 casualties, c. 5.6 million refugees and 
c. 6.6 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), along with its 
reconstruction bill of over US$250 billion, underpin this claim,2 
as do credible narratives describing the scale of abuse carried out 
by the Syrian regime against the country’s civilian population.3 
While the Assad regime tries to give the impression that normal-
ity has returned to large parts of Syria,4 it will actually be dec-
ades before the wounds created by this conflict have ‘healed’ in 
terms of trauma, frayed societal tissue and depleted social capi-
tal. 
Beyond such appalling carnage and destruction, the Syrian 
civil war is also highly relevant from a geopolitical perspective. 
Not only is it the place where both the hope and repression of 
the Arab Uprisings continue to reverberate, it is also a (proxy) 
battleground for various regional and global power competitions 
that have superimposed themselves on the drivers of local con-
flict. As a result, the conflict’s key drivers, as well as the possi-
bilities for its resolution, lie largely outside of Syria. At the 
diplomatic level, there is the moribund, Syrian-focused Geneva 
peace process run by the UN and the faster-paced Astana and 
                                                     
1 I am grateful for the review of this essay by Samar Batrawi (research fel-
low at Clingendael) and Hamidreza Azizi (assistant professor at Shahid Be-
heshti University in Iran). Its contents remain my own responsibility. 
2 Data are taken from http://www.syriahr.com/en/; https://data2.un-
hcr.org/en/situations/syria (accessed 18 March 2019); World Bank Group, 
The Toll of War: The Economic and Social Consequences of the Conflict in 
Syria, Washington DC: WBG, 2017. Note that conflict casualty figures are 
notoriously unreliable as they are prone to both over- and underreporting. 
3 De Silva, D. et al. (2014), Report into the credibility of certain evidence 
with regard to torture and execution of persons incarcerated by the current 
Syrian regime (‘Caesar report’), London: online (accessed 30 September 
2018).     
4 For example, SANA (the Syrian Arab News Agency) reported the 2017 
Damascus International Fair to ‘have succeeded beyond expectations’ to 
demonstrate that Syria ‘is open for business’. 
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Sochi peace processes, which are Turkish/Iranian/Russian-oper-
ated.5 At the military level, there is the largely impotent Syrian 
Arab Army (SAA) on the one hand, and the Russian air force 
and Iran-affiliated forces on the other.6 Finally, Syria’s location 
as an intersection between Africa, Europe and Asia and between 
Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran makes it both a participant 
in, and victim of, proxy warfare, refugees, radicalism and crime. 
All of this ensures that any political settlement emerging from 
its ruins will project a long shadow, commanding ongoing inter-
est from its neighbours. 
It is from this perspective that the essay explores how the 
interests of key foreign state actors in the Syrian conflict will 
help or hinder the nature, comprehensiveness and speed of re-
construction in those parts of the country under the control of 
President Assad.7 Currently, the supply of and demand for re-
construction are grossly mismatched in both focus and volume.8 
                                                     
5 While none of these peace processes have so far been conclusive, the con-
trast between four Geneva conferences on the one hand and eight ‘Astana 
talks’ and one conference in Sochi on the other, suggest that the Astana-So-
chi track is more active. It is not necessarily more inclusive. Some of its 
meetings are tripartite consultations between Russia, Iran and Turkey about 
Syria. 
6 See for example: Keen, D., Syria: Playing into their hands, London: Saf-
erworld, 2017; Vatanka, A., Iran’s use of Shi’i militant proxies, Washington 
DC: Middle East Institute, Policy Paper 2018-5, 2018; Steinberg, G., Die 
shiitische internationale, Berlin: SWP, 2018. Also consider, more specifi-
cally, the interventions by Hezbollah (2012), Iran (2013), Russia (2015) and 
support from various Gulf countries (2011/12-2017), as well as interven-
tions by Turkey (2016, 2017 and 2018), France (2016) and the US (2017). 
7 The essay considers ‘states’ in neo-realist fashion. It does not examine dif-
ferent decision-making centres within states but views them as unitary ac-
tors. This is an abstraction of reality permissible to the extent that it helps 
understand the main motivations of the key state protagonists in the Syrian 
civil war. 
8 Simply put, the sums needed for reconstruction are large (upwards of 
US$250 billion), Syria’s business elite is unable to mobilise this kind of 
money in the face of current Western sanctions, Syria’s international allies 
(Russia, Iran) are also in all likelihood unable to contribute such resources 
while Western countries are unwilling to do so. The Gulf countries are an 
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A better understanding of the probable role of foreign state ac-
tors – in particular the US, Russia, the EU, Iran, Turkey, Saudi 
Arabia and Israel – in decreasing, maintaining or increasing this 
gap will help assess the prospects for Syria’s stability. In terms 
of closing the gap between supply and demand for reconstruc-
tion efforts, foreign state actors can allocate funds directly to 
Syrian reconstruction in the form of aid and concessional lend-
ing, or indirectly by providing incentives for private businesses 
in their own jurisdictions to engage. 
 
 
Syria as battlefield of global geopolitics 
It is commonplace to view the Syrian conflict at least in part as 
yet another site of US-Russian contestation, but this risks funda-
mental misrepresentation of the situation. After all, the US has 
not been an effective party to the original Syrian conflict (the 
uprising against President Assad), and neither does it view Rus-
sia as a global peer.9 Instead, US interests have centred on the 
                                                     
alternative source of funding and have been making tentative moves to-
wards an accommodation with President Assad (e.g. Kuwait and the United 
Arab Emirates are at various stages of reopening their embassies in Damas-
cus). Yet, the overarching Saudi-Iranian tensions make it unlikely that sig-
nificant reconstruction finance will be forthcoming soon other than what is 
needed to normalise relations, or perhaps in economic sectors that are of 
strategic relevance to the Gulf. On the ‘old’ and ‘new’ guard of Syria’s busi-
ness elite see: Rabat, L., Who will rebuild Syria: Extremely loud and incred-
ibly close, Modern Diplomacy, online, 2019. On Western attitudes towards 
reconstruction see: https://www.presstv.com/De-
tail/2019/03/17/591288/Syria-reconstruction-US-UK-France-statement (ac-
cessed 18 March 2019). Also consider the ‘No Assistance to Assad Act’ that 
is under review in the US Congress and Senate: https://www.con-
gress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/4681 (accessed 18 March 2018). 
Finally: Batrawi, S. (2018), Drivers of urban reconstruction in Syria: 
power, privilege and profit extraction, The Hague: Clingendael. 
9 See: Hamidi, I., ‘Syria at a crossroads: ‘A peace to end all peace?’, Turkish 
policy quarterly, Fall 2017; Van Dam, N., Destroying a nation: The civil 
war in Syria, London: IB Taurus, 2017; Price, B., ‘Syria: A wicked problem 
for all’, CTC Sentinel, Special Issue, Vol. 6, Issue 8, August 2013; Lo, B., 
Russia and the new world disorder, London: Chatham House, 2015. 
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defeat of Islamic State (IS) and countering Iran’s growing influ-
ence in the Middle East.10 As a consequence, only part of the US 
vs. Russia framework has analytical usefulness, namely the ob-
servation that Russia views and uses the conflict in Syria as part 
of its strategy to reassert itself as a global power on a par with 
the US.11  
Understanding the 2015 Russian intervention in the Syrian 
conflict requires a brief examination of the gap that the previous 
25 years created between the Kremlin’s self-perception as a 
great power and its treatment as a second-rate power by most 
Western countries throughout the 1990s and 2000s.12 NATO se-
curity expansion, EU economic expansion and Western political 
marginalisation during a period of Russian political-economic 
upheaval and weakness created a nationalist revanchism that was 
further aggravated by NATO’s perceived abuse of UN Security 
Council Resolution No. 1973 to topple the Libyan regime of 
Colonel Kaddafi (2011) and the EU’s efforts to draw Ukraine 
firmly into its economic orbit through the EU-Ukraine Associa-
tion Agreement (2014). Throughout the same period, the Krem-
lin gradually re-established its control over the Russian state 
apparatus, modernised its military and stabilised its economy 
through Kremlin-centred crony capitalist networks, heavy reli-
ance on natural resources, and some economic diversification to-
wards Asia.13 The result is a new Russian foreign policy 
assertiveness that pursues two core strategic interests. First, if 
Russia cares about an issue, it expects to be part of the group of 
states politically deciding it. Second, it calls the shots in the for-
mer Soviet space, albeit on the understanding that old-fashioned, 
                                                     
10 Alaaldin, R.; Fritz, J., S Heydemann et al, A 10-degree shift in Syria strat-
egy, Washington DC: Brookings, 2018; Barnes-Dacey, J., E. Geranmayeh, 
H. Lovatt, The Middle East’s new battle lines, London: ECFR, 2018. 
11 Lo (2015), op.cit.; Rodkiewicz, ‘Russia’s Middle Eastern Policy: Re-
gional ambitions, global objections’, OSW Studies No. 71, 2017. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Judah, B., Fragile empire: How Russia fell in and out of love with Vladi-
mir Putin, New Haven: YUP, 2014; Lo (2015), op.cit. 
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total USSR dominance has been replaced by a more complex and 
variable web of economic, military and social ties.14  
From this perspective, the Syrian conflict is at least in part 
a Russian gambit to re-establish its influence as a key player in 
the great power concert that manages today’s multipolarity.15 It 
is not necessarily the case that Russia’s intervention was proac-
tively planned with such an objective in mind. In fact, it may 
well have been the immediate threat against its access to the 
Mediterranean port of Tartus, the imminent overthrow of the 
Syrian regime as a Russian ally, or even the Iranian request for 
help that triggered the involvement of Russia’s armed forces in 
2015. But all of this needs to be seen in the broader context of 
‘revanchism’ and great power re-establishment outlined above. 
In short, the exact chain and sequence of motivations and actions 
arguably matters less than the underlying foreign policy outlook. 
If this assessment of Russia’s Syrian gambit is correct, it 
makes ensuring the survival of President Assad himself and 
blocking a more US-oriented resolution of the conflict mostly a 
means to an end.16 Russia’s efforts since 2015 to detach Turkey 
as much as possible from its Western moorings should also be 
seen as an opportunistic move that both plays into its global 
agenda and serves to increase its regional room for manoeuver.17 
While the jury is still out on this last stratagem, it is clear that 
Ankara has substantially increased its foreign policy autonomy 
vis-à-vis the US on issues such as the purchase of the S-400 air 
defence system, the Syrian Kurds, and its relations with Iran. 
The stated objective of Russia’s intervention in Syria ‘to defeat 
                                                     
14 Ibid.  
15 For a broader assessment of Russia’s foreign policy objectives in the Mid-
dle East, which prominently includes its quest for great power status in its 
confrontation with the West: Kozhanov, N., Russian policy across the Mid-
dle East: Motivation and methods, London: Chatham House, 2018. 
16 Trenin, D., ‘What drives Russia’s policy in the Middle East?’, in: 
Popescu, N. and Secrieru S., ‘Russia’s return to the Middle East: Building 
sandcastles?’, EU ISS Chaillot papers, No, 146, July 2018. 
17 Rodwiezicz (2017), op.cit. Note that Turkey-EU relations were already 
troubled before the Syrian conflict. 
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terrorism’ must, on inspection of the evidence, be almost wholly 
considered an international smokescreen.18  
In the pursuit of its ‘real’ objectives, Russia has consistently 
applied an adroit mix of classic foreign policy instruments, i.e. 
diplomatic pressure (initially via the UN Security Council and 
later via the Astana/Sochi peace processes) and high-powered 
expeditionary military force.19 This allowed it to notch up two 
key political results: 1) veto power in determining the progress 
of the conflict as Syrian regime offensives are not possible with-
out Russian (air) support, and 2) a new set of pragmatic relations 
with Turkey, Iran and even Israel that puts Russia at the centre 
of regional diplomacy and, in consequence, of any conflict res-
olution framework for the Syrian civil war.  
While there is little evidence that Russia’s intervention has 
re-established it in the premier league of great powers, this ob-
jective could still be satisfied by it being a key player in deliver-
ing an internationally accepted resolution to the Syrian conflict. 
While it is essential for the sustainability of such a resolution 
that the reconstruction of Syria is taken in hand, this does not 
necessarily require a significant contribution from Russia. It 
would be enough if others pick up the reconstruction bill, and 
this is an area of focus for Russian at the moment.20 This is be-
                                                     
18 See for instance: Gaub, F., ‘Russia’s non-war on Daesh’, in: Popescu and 
Secrieru (2018), op.cit.; Bellingcat online reporting on targets of Russian 
airstrikes (accessed 13 October 2018). While there is a connection in the 
form of Chechen fighters among Syria’s opposition, the Kremlin’s effective 
suppression of militant Islamism in the second Chechen war and Kadyrov’s 
iron fisted rule since indicate that Russia has good domestic control over its 
‘terrorist challenges’, despite the continuation of a low-level insurgency in 
the northern Caucasus. 
19 Kaim, M. and O. Tamminga, ‘Russia’s military intervention in Syria’, 
SWP Comment, No. 48, 2015; Delanoë, I., What Russia gained from its mili-
tary intervention in Syria, Orient XXI, 2018, Online (accessed 13 October 
2018). On its sustainability: Secrieru, S., ‘The real and hidden costs of Rus-
sia’s foreign policy’, EU ISS Issue Briefs, No. 2, 2018. 
20 See for example Bloomberg Online on 12 October 2018 (accessed 13 Oc-
tober 2018). 
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cause ensuring minimal stability in post-conflict Syria and main-
taining a meaningful state-centric model of Russian-Syrian co-
operation requires the re-establishment of the Syrian state with 
at least core capabilities. This, in turn, demands some degree of 
state-led reconstruction for which external funds are required. 
Secondly, Western assistance for reconstruction would essen-
tially prove Russia right and confer legitimacy on its interven-
tion by recognising that President Assad was the only option to 
win the fight again ‘terrorism’. It goes without saying that the 
Syrian-state-to-be-reconstituted would be centralised in nature 
and revert to its pre-2011 crony capitalist practices, in line with 
the regime’s and Russia’s preferences.21 Any financial contribu-
tion of Russia itself is likely to be limited to Syria’s oil and gas 
industry which, as it happens, is also the only economic sector 
that can turn a profit in the short term (regional pipeline politics, 
in particular, being important).22 
In sum, Russia has an appreciable interest in Syria’s recon-
struction, provided it is state-led and state-focused. It may be 
prepared to negotiate with the Syrian regime to extract political 
concessions that fall short of meaningful change in exchange for 
financial reconstruction contributions from other countries. It 
should be kept in mind, however, that Russia’s ability to extract 
such concessions from the regime is limited and likely to decline 
                                                     
21 Batrawi, S. and N. Grinstead, Six scenarios for pro-regime militias in 
‘post-war’ Syria, The Hague: Clingendael, 2019; see also: Khatib, L. and L. 
Sinjab, Syria’s transactional state: How the conflict changed the Syrian 
state’s exercise of power, London: Chatham House, 2018. 
22 In January 2018, President Assad gave Russia the sole rights to oil and 
gas production in Syria. See: http://theconversation.com/armed-by-the-
kremlin-gazprom-could-be-the-new-force-in-syria-when-the-troops-leave-
101492 (accessed 18 March 2019). A sustained presence of Russian energy 
companies implies, incidentally, a permanent Russian military presence in 
the form of ‘company forces’ to protect key facilities. The trouble today is 
that a number of key oil and gas fields are located in areas occupied by the 
non-regime-aligned Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). 
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once the guns fall silent and its use to the Syrian regime de-
creases.23  
 
From uninterested to weak: The US, the EU, and the Syrian conflict  
The lack of US engagement with the original Syrian conflict, its 
half-hearted policies, and the complete absence of an effective 
EU approach to the conflict enabled Russian successes and re-
duced the West’s options for dealing with Syria’s reconstruction. 
Despite having a significant interest in a stable and democratic 
Syria, the EU is currently relegated to financing a significant part 
of the cost of hosting Syria’s more than 5 million refugees in the 
region through its compacts while at the same time lacking po-
litical influence or even channels of diplomatic communication 
with the Syrian regime.24 Its sanctions, support for accountabil-
ity-for-war-crimes initiatives and feeble military actions – such 
as British and Dutch support for armed opposition groups and 
French forces active in northern Syria – have meanwhile put it 
on the regime’s blacklist. That it is not completely without influ-
ence is only because of the reconstruction finance it could po-
tentially contribute. Yet, given the Assad regime’s re-
entrenchment, which is already underway, and its crony capital-
ist economic policies from before 2011, it is highly doubtful that 
a sufficiently fine-grained implementation modality can be 
found that prevents regime capture of European reconstruction 
support.25  
                                                     
23 The extent to which the many pro-regime militias will, or will not, be ef-
fectively integrated into the SAA is an important indicator of Russian lever-
age as such integration is a precondition for re-establishing an effective state 
and runs counter to Iran’s preferences for a more pluriform security sector 
akin to Lebanon or Iraq. Batrawi and Grinstead (2019), op.cit. 
24 See for example the co-chair’s declaration of the Brussels III Conference 
on 'Supporting the future of Syria and the region', online, 14 March 2019; 
Uzelac, A., O. Macharis and E. van Veen, It’s there to stay: A big idea for a 
better response to Syrian displacement, The Hague: Clingendael, online, 
2019.  
25 On the political-economic structure of the Assad regime: Hadidi, S., Z. 
Majed and F. Mardam-Bey, Dans la tête de Bachar al-Assad, Paris: Actes 
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Successive US-administrations viewed the Syrian conflict 
predominantly through the prism of the war-on-terror (after 
2014) and, later, as a regional conflict involving Iran (especially 
after January 2017 when President Trump was inaugurated). The 
war-on-terror frame shifted the US focus from its limited efforts 
to oppose dictatorship to a military campaign aimed at eliminat-
ing IS. While it is not exactly clear what core US security interest 
IS threatened given its focus on the ‘near enemy’, its presence in 
Iraq, combined with the entrenched nature of the 9/11 anti-terror 
paradigm in US political circles, proved sufficient. The US-led 
coalition has been effective in rolling back IS territorial control, 
but it has made little progress in addressing its root causes such 
as Sunni marginalisation in Iraq and dictatorship in Syria.  
Paradoxically, the military focus on defeating IS caused the 
US to provide significant support for the Syrian Kurds,26 with 
the side effect of facilitating Russia’s efforts to broaden the gap 
between Turkey and its Western allies (Turkey views the Syrian 
Democratic Union Party (PYD) as part of the Turkish PKK 
(Kurdistan Workers’ Party), and considers both terrorist organi-
sations). Despite President Trump’s recent announcement of the 
complete withdrawal of US troops from northeastern Syria, the 
subsequent pushback from the US foreign policy establishment 
might ensure a continuous US presence in the area after all.27 
Yet, as it has become clear that Turkey prioritises perceived re-
gional security threats over its relations with the US and its po-
sition in NATO, maintaining even a diminished US-military 
footprint in northeastern Syria will keep Turkey on edge and 
                                                     
Sud, 2018; for thoughts on how European reconstruction support could be 
organized: Decina, A., How should the West play a weak hand in Syria re-
construction?, War on the Rocks, online, 2019; on continuities and ruptures 
in regime methods of rule: Khatib and Sinjab (2018), op.cit. 
26 This mostly concerns the PYD and its associated militias (YPG and YPJ). 
See also: Van Veen, E., ‘Uit de as herrijzend: Syrië en de Koerdische 
kwestie [Rising from the ashes: Syria and the Kurdish question]’, Clingen-
dael Spectator, Vol. 72, Issue 5, 2018. 
27 Commentary abounds on President Trump’s decision. For instance: Pi-
erini, M., The politics of pandemonium, Carnegie Diwan, online, 2019. 
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nourish its new relationship with Russia. In this sense, US policy 
towards northeastern Syria was, and remains, stuck between a 
rock and a hard place. Given the poor state of American-Turkish 
relations and the current obsession of the US administration with 
Iran, it is conceivable that the US will continue to engage in re-
construction-like efforts in Syria’s northeast under the guise of 
‘stabilisation’. This might even happen in the framework of a 
deal between Damascus and Syria’s Kurds.28 
Meanwhile, US confrontation with Iran intensifies by the 
day and shows little sign of abating. The scope and intrusiveness 
of US conditions for re-engagement29 are such that Iran is bound 
to feel vindicated about its intervention in Syria as part of its so-
called ‘forward defence’ strategy.30 It is evident that Iran seeks 
to maintain appreciable strategic influence in Syria via expan-
sion of its economic interests (e.g. transportation, railroads, 
housing) and by loosely integrating some of the forces it spon-
sors into Syria’s reconfigured security sector.31 These elements 
would both embody and enable a regional approach that consol-
idates Iranian influence beyond purely military elements.32  
 
The US appears to be banking on Syria´s weakness and recon-
struction needs further draining Iranian resources. Should this 
increase the level of protest in Iran about the cost of its foreign 
policy actions while sanctions start to bite, the US would have 
                                                     
28 Burcher, E., Has the US given up on stabilization efforts in Syria?, Atlan-
tic Council, online, 2018. 
29 For instance: Pompeo, M., After the deal: A new Iran strategy, Remarks 
at the Heritage Foundation, 21 May 2018. 
30 For an excellent analysis of the evolution of Iran’s Syria strategy and its 
underlying foreign policy interests: Ahmadian, H. and P. Mohseni, ‘Iran’s 
Syria strategy: The evolution of deterrence’, International Affairs, 95:2, 
2019; also: International Crisis Group, Iran’s priorities in a turbulent Mid-
dle East, Brussels: ICG, 2018a. 
31 Azizi, H., Iran eyes major role in Syria via reconstruction, Al-Monitor, 
online, 2018; Batrawi and Grinstead (2019), op.cit. 
32 Azizi, H., What Rouhani´s visit to Iraq tells us about Iran´s Syria policy, 
Al-Monitor, online, 2019. 
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achieved one of the aims of its sanctions policy. However, on 
balance this is unlikely as the growing anti-US stance of the Ira-
nian population is likely to outweigh its dissatisfaction with its 
leadership’s economic policies. It should also be taken into ac-
count that the Iranian security services maintain a firm grip on 
both society and the economy.33 It is more likely that Iran will 
stimulate its businesses to engage in the reconstruction of Syria 
on commercial terms rather than providing greater state re-
sources for reconstruction efforts, thus expanding its influence 
and potentially recouping some of its investments.34 To make 
this possible, the Iranian government could seek to entice greater 
Chinese investment in Iran, Iraq and Syria by offering to 
strengthen the Middle Eastern corridor of the Belt and Road In-
itiative towards Europe.35 In the medium term, such an approach 
could help Iran cope with the negative effects of US sanctions 
although BRI benefits present a double-edged sword to Iran as 
they would further increase its already significant economic de-
pendence on China.36 Moreover, the growing caution about Chi-
nese investment in Europe might yet throw a spanner in the 
                                                     
33 See for instance: Wright, R., Iran celebrates the revolution’s fortieth an-
niversary: Twelve blocks from the White House, The New Yorker, online, 
2019. This is not to say there are no risks to stability in Iran, such as the new 
sense of political agency of Iran’s lower classes acquired through the pro-
tests of December 2017/January 2018. On this topic: Khian, A., La révolte 
des pauvres ébranle le régime en Iran, Orient XXI, online, 2018. Yet, sev-
eral interviews by the author in Tehran in January 2019 suggested that the 
Iranian government is capable of handling such protests without too much 
repression and that the middle classes fear the instability that would come 
with protracted protests.  
34 Note that Iran’s leaders were concerned about mission creep from the on-
set of their involvement in the Syrian conflict, which also makes it less 
likely for state-funding for Syria’s reconstruction to be forthcoming. ICG 
(2018a), op.cit. Furthermore, many Iranian enterprises have links to the Ira-
nian Revolutionary Guard Corps.  
35 Azizi (2018), op.cit. 
36 Shariatinia, M. and H. Azizi, ‘Iran and the Belt and Road Initiative: Amid 
Hope and Fear’, Journal of Contemporary China, online, 2019. 
Syria Studies   45 
works by closing parts of the EU market to Chinese business ac-
tivity.37 
 
 
Syria as a pawn on the regional political chessboard 
It is the combination of the global and regional dimensions of 
the Syrian conflict that makes it difficult to resolve via interna-
tional diplomacy. The conflict’s regional dimension centres on 
Iranian-Saudi competition across the Middle East, including 
Syria, with Turkey and Israel acting as bit players specific to the 
Syrian theatre. For a brief moment, the regional powers per-
ceived the Syrian conflict through the lens of the Arab Uprisings. 
It is worth recalling that significant parts of the Iranian foreign 
policy elite as well as its population initially sympathized with 
the Syrian opposition in their rebellion against President Assad’s 
autocracy in a situation not dissimilar from their own revolt 
against the Shah in 1979.38  
In contrast, the Saudis’ initially supported President Assad 
as fellow autocrat and out of fear for further revolutionary 
change in the region. In parallel, the Saudi monarchy had been 
concerned about growing Iranian dominance in Iraq since 2003. 
In 2011, these fears were deepened by US ‘betrayal’ – as per-
ceived by the House of Saud – of common allies such as Egypt’s 
Mubarak and Yemen’s Saleh. Once it became clear that the US 
let events run their course and prioritised its nuclear negotiations 
with Iran over maintaining the Saudi-led status quo in the Middle 
East, the initial Saudi framework quickly gave way to one of 
conservative realpolitik – disguised as sectarian strife.39 The 
                                                     
37 Moreover, in a recent twitter exchange, Hamidreza Azizi (@HamidRe-
zaAz) cogently pointed out that the Chinese government may progress BRI 
initiatives only in parallel with progress in operationalizing the EU’s Special 
Purpose Vehicle (SPV), presumably to improve international coverage 
against a predictably hostile US response. In other words, more may ride on 
the EU’s SPV than is commonly assumed. 
38 Ahmadian and Mohseni (2019), op.cit. 
39 Lynch offers an accessible overview of some key geopolitical and social 
developments in the Middle East after 2011: Lynch, M., The new Arab 
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remedy that the Saudi’s deployed in response was a much more 
assertive middle eastern foreign policy.40 In Syria, this took the 
form of supporting a range of moderate and not-so-moderate 
proxies to overthrow President Assad, who was recast from fel-
low autocrat into Iranian ally. The evolution of the Syrian bat-
tlefield has by now demonstrated the shortcomings of this 
strategy in the face of – probably underestimated – direct and 
large-scale Iranian and Russian support for the Syrian regime.  
As far as its involvement in Syria goes, the Saudi monarchy 
arguably scored a victory at the level of discourse rather than on 
the battlefield. Caught between accusations that IS derived much 
of its theological basis from Wahabi religious thought and global 
astonishment at the meteoric rise of radical Sunni militancy, the 
sectarian Sunni vs. Shi’a frame offered the Saudi monarchy a 
‘get-out-of-jail-free-card’ of sorts. By shifting the focus of the 
conflict towards Iranian hegemonial ambitions, Saudi Arabia su-
perseded discussions about how Sunni militant extremism could 
have grown so rapidly, relegating the longstanding observation 
that Shi’a religious tenets and doctrine have seldom been a core 
driver of either Iranian strategy or extremist violence to the back-
ground.41 As it failed on the battlefield, Saudi strategy shifted 
from fighting Iran in Syria to bandwagoning with the Trump ad-
ministration against Iran. Consequentially, it stands to reason 
that the Saudis have little interest in supporting the reconstruc-
tion of Syria.42 
                                                     
wars: Uprisings and anarchy in the Middle East, New York: Public Affairs, 
2016. 
40 Van den Berg, W., Saudi Arabia’s strategic stalemate: What is next?, The 
Hague: Clingendael, 2017. 
41 Scholars already observed in the 1990s that the 1979 Iranian revolution 
was influential because of its ideas and ideology rather than the actual ex-
port of a Shi’a theology-based governance model via Shi’a populations 
throughout the region. Esposito, J. (ed.), The Iranian revolution: Its global 
impact, Miami: Florida University Press, 1990. 
42 For the purpose of this essay, I assume that the other Gulf States (minus 
Qatar and Oman) will follow a Saudi lead in terms of their support – or lack 
thereof – for reconstruction efforts of the Syrian regime.  
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While Syria represents one of a number of sites of confron-
tation with Iran to the Saudis (others include Lebanon, Iraq, 
Yemen, Bahrain and Qatar), to Iran it is more existential. Its core 
interests in the Syrian conflict were clear early on, namely re-
taining a friendly, non-Sunni majority regime in Damascus to 
keep Syria in the ‘resistance’ camp and maintaining a direct link 
with Hezbollah. Preventing the spread of Sunni militant extrem-
ism (after 2014) and connecting its different platforms43 of re-
gional influence in Lebanon and Iraq (after 2015) became 
additional interests in due time. The Iranian government has pur-
sued these interests rigorously and with ample resources – in-
cluding financial infusions from Iran’s Central Bank, the 
deployment of thousands of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
(IRGC) personnel, and the mobilisation and deployment of Shi’a 
militias from Lebanon, Afghanistan and Iraq.44 Iran’s interests 
in Syria have a high intensity preference, which results from at 
least three sources:  
 
• The 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq war still influences the collective 
views of much of the Iranian leadership since many current 
members lived through that war. While the war may have 
been instrumental in cementing conservative clerical power 
at home, it also brought about vast destruction and, ulti-
mately, humiliation. Iran had to accept the pre-existing status 
quo after a costly war initiated by an Iraq supported by much 
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of the West and the Gulf.45 Preventing its recurrence puts a 
premium on securing the neighbourhood as best as possible, 
including Syria.  
• The US invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) 
provided windows of opportunity for Iran to expand its in-
fluence in both countries as much as they produced clear 
warning signs that US invasion in the context of the ‘axis of 
evil’ or the ‘war on terror’ was not just a hypothetical possi-
bility. Iraq’s descent into chaos after 2003 and 2014 offered 
Iran the chance to establish a more contiguous area of influ-
ence stretching from Lebanon to Iran.46  
• The recent hostile US, Israeli and Saudi rhetoric against Teh-
ran will have encouraged Iranian steadfastness in Syria as it 
re-imprints the ‘war on terror’s’ regime change logic on the 
minds of Iran’s leadership.47 The US’s recent cancellation of 
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) will have 
further bolstered Iranian resolve to keep any fight as far away 
                                                     
45 Razoux, P., The Iran-Iraq war, Belknap Press: Cambridge, 2015. Inci-
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46 Ironically, in terms of Iranian political influence in Lebanon, Syria and 
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47 The common argument that Iran deploys a resource-light, forward-de-
fence concept because of its comparatively poor conventional warfare capa-
bilities must be caveated. While Iranian MILEX pales compared with the 
Gulf, the latter’s armies have traditionally been ‘procurement armies’ that 
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Moreover, while formidable, the Israeli Defense Force is too small and alien 
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in-depth assessment of Iran’s deterrence strategy: Ahmadian and Mohseni 
(2019), op.cit. 
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from its frontiers as possible, despite any possible misgiv-
ings in Iranian foreign policy circles about its own role in 
Syria.48 
 
Although the Syrian regime faltered towards the end of 2014, 
despite Iranian support, Russia’s intervention soon tilted the bal-
ance back in Tehran’s favour and it has since steadily increased 
its influence in Syria. Yet, while Russia appears keen to re-es-
tablish at least the core capabilities of the Syrian state, it is 
widely inferred that Iran – building on its practices in Lebanon 
and Iraq – prefers to create a more hybrid arrangement that in-
cludes parastatal organisations, militias, population centres and 
even governance institutions that are loosely associated with the 
state.49 This would create a lever of influence additional to its 
formal and cordial relations with the Syrian regime.50  
Such an approach to ‘reconstruction’ must, however, balance 
two trade-offs. First, it will not match the preferences of the Syr-
ian regime (or those of Russia, for that matter). The Syrian re-
gime may have to tolerate it in the short term due to its own 
weakness but, given its memories and practices of pre-2011 con-
trol, it will not necessarily accept it in the long term. Despite its 
vastly reduced military and economic capabilities, the regime is 
not without agency. Seen from this perspective, cleverly de-
signed external support for reconstruction via the Syrian state 
could actually increase its longer-term independence from Iran. 
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Second, however much Iran might wish, it will struggle to main-
tain a sizeable non-military parallel sphere in a Sunni-dominated 
country.  
In brief, the Iranian view on the reconstruction of Syria de-
viates significantly from the standard, state-centred approach of 
the international community or, for that matter, the preferences 
of the Syrian regime. While Iran’s approach has its limitations, 
establishing selected centres of social control/influence in towns 
like Qusair or around the Sayyidah Zaynab shrine, as well as 
maintaining a security sector-based insurance policy by retain-
ing direct lines of command to a number of militia forces, are 
within its reach. 
 
The bit-players of the Syrian conflict: Turkey and Israel 
Turkish interests in the Syrian civil war narrowed considerably 
between 2012 and 2018 – from the overthrow of President Assad 
to reducing the territorial gains and self-rule of Syria’s Kurds.51 
The concern of the Turkish elite about the rise of Syria’s Kurds 
must primarily be considered in the context of its own unre-
solved Kurdish question, which Turkey has traditionally viewed 
through an unvarnished lens of narrowly-defined nationalism 
and assimilation.52 But Turkey’s anti-Kurdish focus across Tur-
key, Syria and Iraq (excepting the Kurdistan Democratic Party 
(KDP) will also persist because it serves as a useful deflector 
away from its domestic economic turmoil and poor relations 
with the US and EU. 
For the purpose of this essay, three observations on Tur-
key’s involvement in the Syrian civil war matter. First, the Turk-
ish occupation of Afrin, Jarablus, Al-Bab and adjacent areas – 
which was initially seen as a temporary measure to prevent and 
undo the creation of a Kurdish-dominated Turkish-Syrian border 
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area – is starting to show signs of permanence in terms of recon-
struction, military presence and a cross-border link being estab-
lished.53 Second, the failure of Turkey’s anti-Assad strategy, 
coupled with its occupation of Syrian territory, has put it on a 
future collision course with the Syrian regime. Interestingly, 
Russia greenlighted Turkish military moves against the wishes 
of both the Syrian regime and Iran, presumably with the inten-
tion of enhancing its own leverage vis-à-vis both actors. Third, 
Turkish companies are well placed to benefit commercially from 
engaging in Syria’s reconstruction – especially in the Aleppo 
area – due to the large Syrian diaspora on Turkish territory and 
its geographic proximity.54 
On balance, this suggests that Turkey might engage more 
deeply in reconstruction of the parts of Syria it currently occu-
pies as a hedge against the Syrian Kurds, as long as it can main-
tain these areas as part of its own sphere of influence. For 
example, it is imaginable that its Syrian proxies will loosely in-
tegrate with the SAA to police the area but retain substantial 
Turkish links. To this effect, it could come to a practical arrange-
ment with the Syrian regime that also includes support for re-
construction in regime-held areas as long as this involves 
Turkish companies. Given the antipathy between Assad and Er-
dogan, this may require a Russian-mediated deal that also re-
solves the Idlib question and engages Turkey in efforts to 
remove the US military presence from northeastern Syria alto-
gether. 
As to Israel, its initial stance of benign neglect towards the 
Syrian civil war under the motto ‘where two dogs fight over a 
bone…’ has boomeranged now that it is faced with the specter 
of increasing Iranian influence and permanent, Iran-linked mili-
tary installations on Syrian soil. While this has significantly 
raised the stakes for Israel, the country has little leverage over 
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the politics of the Syrian civil war other than the airstrikes it reg-
ularly executes against SAA, Hezbollah and Iran-affiliated 
forces. Although it used to conduct these with impunity, the IL-
20M incident on 18 September 2018, subsequent Russian rheto-
ric and Russia’s deployment of several S-300 missile batteries to 
the benefit of the SAA have made their continuation somewhat 
more delicate.55 Despite Russian cooperation with Israel to re-
move Iran-affiliated forces from the direct vicinity of the Syrian-
Israeli border area, the ongoing process of integration of foreign 
and domestic pro-regime militias into the SAA could easily 
muddle the waters for Israeli strike planners in the near future. 
Should Iran try to restart its earlier efforts to establish a mil-
itary presence in southwestern Syria, it would put itself on a dan-
gerous collision course with Israel, and perhaps even Russia. 
Yet, because this scenario does not serve the Iranian short-term 
interest of consolidating its influence in Syria, it is more likely 
that the informal buffer zone already in place in the southwest 
will be maintained to defuse the situation – for now.56 Alterna-
tively, should Israel decide to launch an all-out air campaign 
against Iranian military assets across Syria, the risks of confron-
tation with Iran, as well as with Russia, would increase. Its recent 
strike patterns do not, however, support this scenario as they are 
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concentrated on the Damascus area and military research facili-
ties in western Syria.57 A mutually tolerated stalemate with a re-
spectful distance between them is the more likely future for 
SAA-embedded Iranian militia forces and their Israeli Defense 
Forces counterparts. 
Overall, it is plausible to assume that Israel will diplomati-
cally and discretely support Russia’s efforts to enable the re-es-
tablishment of the Syrian central state through state-led 
reconstruction efforts to counter Iranian influence while main-
taining its airstrike policy as long as it can.  
 
Implications for reconstruction 
This essay has addressed the question of how the interests of key 
foreign state actors in the Syrian conflict will help or hinder re-
construction of those parts of the country under the control of 
President Assad. Its key findings and insights are summarised 
below. 
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Table 1: Key interests of selected foreign state actors in the Syrian con-
flict & implications for reconstruction efforts in Assad-held areas 
 
State actor Key current interests 
in the Syrian conflict 
Preference 
intensity in 
Syria  
Assets 
deployed 
in 
Syria58 
Leverage 
on course 
of conflict 
Likely implications for reconstruc-
tion support 
US Eliminating IS  
 
Moderate 
Low Low 
− May support reconstruction framed as 
‘stabilisation’ in Kurdish-controlled 
northeast Syria 
− Refrains from all other reconstruction  
 Weakening Iran Moderate 
Russia Reasserting itself as a 
global power 
High 
High High 
− Strives for internationally accepted 
conflict resolution 
− Lobbies others to support ‘minimum 
reconstruction’ of Syrian state 
− Seeks commercial benefit 
 Re-establishing a 
friendly Syrian state 
High 
 Unmooring Turkey 
from the West 
Low 
EU Bringing a political 
transition about 
Moderate Nil Low − No reconstruction support unless the 
elusive political transition occurs 
− Focus by necessity on regional refugee 
situation 
− Weakening Iran is not a consideration 
Saudi Arabia Overthrow of Assad as 
ally of Iran 
High Low Low None likely to be forthcoming beyond 
bare minimum required for normalisa-
tion of relations 
Iran Retaining a friendly re-
gime 
High 
High High 
− Support for ‘minimum reconstruction’ 
of Syrian regime 
− Reconstruction of a quasi-autonomous 
sphere of influence  
 Establishing a parallel 
sphere of influence 
High 
 Connecting its areas of 
influence in the Middle 
East 
Moderate 
Turkey Undoing Kurdish au-
tonomy gains 
High Moderate Low − Reconstruction of occupied bits of 
northern Syria to establish a zone of 
influence 
− May seek commercial benefit 
Israel Rollback of Iran-linked 
military presence 
High Moderate Low − No direct reconstruction support 
− May discretely support Russian fund-
raising efforts as part of its anti-Iran 
strategy 
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Based on Table 1, a few initial answers to the main question 
of the essay can be outlined:  
First, if the current military balance and presence of forces 
persist without a negotiated diplomatic breakthrough, Syria’s re-
construction is likely to be territorially fragmented, limited in 
nature and driven by Iran-Russia-Assad, Turkey and the US in 
their respective areas of influence. Iran will work closely with 
the Syrian regime and Russia although significant tensions will 
continue to exist between these three actors.59 Turkey may also 
work with Russia to some extent. 
Second, reconstruction of regime-held areas of Syria is 
likely to be protracted and partial as the demand for infrastruc-
ture, housing, education and governance will outstrip the supply 
of available funds for the foreseeable future. This observation 
will hold as long as the US, EU, key European countries and 
Gulf countries maintain their current policies towards the Syrian 
regime, which they are likely to do for the time being. 
Third, should any of the preceding actors change policy, 
support for reconstruction will be implemented in a politically 
contentious and commercially profiteering environment charac-
terised by crony capitalism and nepotism in which Iranian, Rus-
sian and Syrian interests compete to influence the shape, focus 
and functions of the Syrian state as it is re-established. 
In the final analysis, the combination of the variable global 
interests of the US (war on terror, anti-Iran) and Russia (re-es-
tablishing great power status, keeping Syria on its side) with re-
gional conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran makes the 
reconstruction of Syria hostage to irreconcilable agendas given 
the country’s association with Iran. Potential intermediaries such 
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as Turkey and the EU will not engage in countrywide reconstruc-
tion at this point. Turkey suffers from domestic turmoil and rad-
ical shifts in its foreign policy that have rendered it ineffective, 
while the EU’s foreign policy indecisiveness has relegated it to 
the sidelines. Israel was never going to engage directly in Syria’s 
reconstruction but also finds itself without political influence 
other than the one-trick pony of its regular airstrikes.  
There is an urgent need for detailed scenario-planning that 
explores the long-term consequences of the fragmented, incre-
mental and limited reconstruction that will result from the above 
state of play for the Syrian regime, the Syrian population, Syria’s 
neighbours and beyond. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
